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Abstract 
This paper aims at analyzing how controlling shareholders’ representatives on boards impact 
on corporate social responsibility (CSR) strategies (disclosing CSR matters) in Spain, a 
context characterized by high ownership concentration, one-tier boards, little board 
independence, weak legal protection for investors and the presence of large shareholders, 
especially institutional shareholders. Furthermore, among controlling shareholders’ 
representatives, we can distinguish between those appointed by insurance companies and 
banks and those appointed by mutual funds, investment funds and pension funds. The effect 
of these categories of directors on CSR strategies is, therefore, also analyzed. Our findings 
suggest that controlling shareholders’ representatives have a positive effect on CSR strategies, 
as do directors appointed by investment funds, pension funds and mutual funds, while 
directors appointed by banks and insurance companies have no impact on CSR strategies. 
This analysis offers new insights into the role played by certain types of directors on CSR 
strategies. 
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CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY STRATEGIES OF SPANISH LISTED 
FIRMS AND CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDERS’ REPRESENTATIVES  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) can be defined as “a concept whereby 
companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their business operations and in 
their interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis” (European Commission, 
2001:7). This description underlines the idea that firms voluntarily become involved with 
society and the environment in order to enhance and improve them. As noted by Santos 
(2011), this definition of CSR combines diverse objectives that must be integrated into the 
management process and go hand in hand with the objective of achieving positive economic 
outcomes.  
The rapid globalization process has placed companies on a new stage where they are 
more aware of promoting CSR disclosure. In other words, if firms want to survive in today’s 
very competitive environment, they will have to adapt to the global economy and, as a 
consequence, they will not only have to pay attention to the economic dimension, but will 
also have to increase their interest in the social and environmental dimensions of their 
businesses. Additionally, the pressure exerted by a company’s interest groups, including non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), customers and their own workers, as well as stricter 
laws on CSR matters, have meant that firms must be held accountable for their economic, 
social and environmental activities if they wish to be competitive. Thus, globalization has 
raised the priority of CSR disclosure on the agenda of Spanish listed firms, since they have to 
behave in a similar way to other listed firms around the world in order to compete in 
international markets that have become more socially aware, and the true driver of disclosing 
CSR matters among Spanish listed companies has been increased social awareness (Olcese, 
2012).  
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Authors such as Morsing and Schultz (2006) support the view that firms must be 
responsible to all of their stakeholders, because their activities have consequences not only for 
those belonging to the firm, but also for third parties. Waddock (2003) argues that firms are 
interested in adopting CSR as a business management model because they can develop 
systems and policies based on benefits to the company and its stakeholders. Therefore, 
although the first reason for integrating CSR is to be sustainable over the long term, 
companies must also consider broader social and environmental dimensions. The importance 
of firms’ social practices has generated a demand for information to allow judgments to be 
made as to the extent to which companies are ethical and, consequently, public reports on 
CSR are essential to identify which companies are, or are not, committed to society and all 
their stakeholders.  
Thus, these views highlight the importance of firms’ CSR disclosure for society, 
practitioners and academia. First, in the current context, CSR reporting is relevant for society 
since the purpose of CSR programs is to satisfy social requirements (Angelidis and Ibrahim, 
1993). Society is interested in knowing what firms are doing in relation to CSR matters. Some 
of these matters may affect society and, therefore, society pushes firms to show their 
commitment to CSR issues in order to satisfy the demands of stakeholders (among which 
society is included). Firms may report CSR information with the purpose of demonstrating 
their commitment. In this sense, CSR reporting becomes an important mechanism by which 
society assesses these purposes. Second, practitioners, particularly those familiar with CSR 
matters, are conscious that firms not involved with CSR issues may have a reputational crisis 
and, as a result, have to find out which values are most important for their stakeholders in 
order to satisfy their demands. In line with this, CSR reporting is gaining in importance as it 
allows practitioners to keep stakeholders informed about firms’ CSR matters, thus avoiding a 
reputational crisis and helping them to improve the relationship between firms and society. 
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Practitioners are interested in providing understandable CSR reports and achieving a good 
reputation because this is likely to have positive repercussions on a firm’s profits. Finally, 
CSR literature has received growing attention in recent decades since there is a gap to be 
filled regarding how CSR disclosure impacts different business decisions. Thus, CSR 
reporting helps researchers to collect data in order to show evidence of these issues and, 
accordingly, this evidence may also be useful for supervisory bodies, practitioners and 
society.  
Sánchez-Ballesta and García-Meca (2007) show that corporate governance 
mechanisms generate corporate behavior that influences CSR disclosure. Cuadrado-Ballestero 
et al. (2015) place specific emphasis on the influence of boards on CSR disclosure, with 
particular reference to size and independence, for example. Systematic reviews by Hahn and 
Kuhnen (2013) and Dienes et al. (2016) also identify board independence and size as 
corporate governance structure determinants affecting CSR disclosure (e.g., Jizi et al., 2014). 
Other identified determinants are board activity measured as board meetings (e.g., Kent and 
Monem, 2008), board gender diversity (e.g., Fernandez-Feijoo et al., 2014) and CEO duality 
(e.g., Jizi et al., 2014). An excellent revision of past and recent research focused on the 
influence of these corporate governance determinants on CSR reporting can be found in Hahn 
and Kuhnen (2013) and Dienes et al. (2016). Miras-Rodríguez et al. (2015) also underline that 
cultural, legal and political aspects may affect a firm when it makes decisions on CSR. 
However, little attention has been paid to other board characteristics, such as the presence of 
institutional directors. 
This analysis has shown that institutional directors, who represent institutional 
investors such as pension funds, insurance companies and banks, have increased their 
influence on the financial markets as they have abandoned their former passive roles on 
company boards and, consequently, have begun to perform an important role in monitoring 
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management teams (López-Iturriaga et al., 2015). In this regard, previous research 
demonstrates that these directors have an effect on leverage (e.g., David et al., 2001) and 
financial reporting quality (e.g., Pucheta-Martínez and García-Meca, 2014), inter alia. 
Institutional activism (direct involvement) may lead to firms being more involved in socially 
responsible investments and practices. In this sense, institutional investors have increased 
their activism concerning CSR in an attempt to integrate social, ethical and environmental 
matters in their businesses. Institutional investors may participate as directors and 
shareholders in the decision-making process of a firm and, thereby, can play a relevant and 
active monitoring role in relation to managers, since they are concerned about their reputation 
and, consequently, will put pressure on firms to disclose CSR information. Hence, 
institutional investors will endorse the sustainability of companies in which they have 
invested.  
Accordingly, the impact of institutional directors on the governance of firms, the 
positive effects that CSR can have on companies, the daily attention given by boards to CSR 
matters and the small amount of research that has explored the association between corporate 
governance mechanisms and CSR (e.g., Fernández-Sánchez et al., 2011) provide us with the 
motivation to examine the impact of institutional directors on strategic company decisions 
like CSR disclosure. Therefore, the purpose of this research is to analyze how CSR disclosure 
by Spanish listed companies is affected by the presence of institutional directors on their 
boards. In addition, past literature (e.g., Almazán et al., 2005; Choi et al., 2012) has shown 
that it is important not to consider institutional directors as a homogeneous group. In this 
sense, López-Iturriaga et al. (2015), among others, emphasize that “the type of business 
relation between firms and institutional investors is the key to describing the role of 
institutional directors”. In this sense, we distinguish between pressure-sensitive institutional 
directors, who represent pressure-sensitive investors who maintain both an investment and a 
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business relationship with the firm, and pressure-resistant institutional directors, who 
represent pressure-resistant investors who only maintain an investment relationship with the 
firm. Past and recent research has also distinguished between pressure-sensitive and pressure-
resistant institutional directors (e.g., Almazán et al., 2005; Choi et al., 2012; López-Iturriaga 
et al., 2015), arguing that pressure-sensitive directors are more likely to be influenced by 
managers. The fact that pressure-sensitive investors maintain commercial ties with the firm 
explains the term “pressure-sensitive” because these investors are under pressure from the 
management team since they do not want to lose their business links; consequently, they are 
more sensitive to pressure. This view is supported by Davis and Thompson (1994), who argue 
that proxy voting allows managers to know whether institutional investors voted against them 
or with them. Consequently, various institutional investors (banks and insurance companies) 
are pressed to support managers’ agendas due to their actual or potential business operations 
with firms, which involve dealing with managers. In contrast to this, pressure-resistant 
investors do not maintain such commercial relationships and, as a result, are not under such 
pressure and can behave more independently (Davis and Thompson, 1994), which explains 
the expression “pressure-resistant”. Hence, we also explore the effects of pressure-sensitive 
and pressure-resistant directors on CSR reporting, since it is expected that they differ. This 
investigation is performed in Spain, which gives a different setting from other countries 
because, among other reasons, there is an important presence of controlling shareholders in 
firms, mainly institutional investors. An analysis of the role performed by institutional 
directors on CSR reporting, in an environment where institutions are important controlling 
shareholders, merits attention. 
It is important to remark, in line with Font et al. (2012) and Bowen and Aragon-Correa 
(2014), that CSR disclosure and CSR commitment do not have to go hand in hand. In this 
sense, the fact that firms disclose CSR information about their environmental and social 
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programs does not mean that they have to be responsible or commit to CSR, since it may be 
likely that they are only hoping to improve their reputation.  
This paper contributes to the literature in several respects. First, our evidence 
reinforces the view that institutional directors protect the interests not only of the 
shareholders, but also of all stakeholders of the firm. Our findings show that institutional 
directors on boards encourage CSR disclosure; it is not only the shareholders who can benefit 
from this, but also all the other stakeholders, since CSR information is public and is 
accessible to both shareholders and stakeholders. Second, we fill the gap in the prior research 
concerning the role played by institutional directors in firms’ CSR disclosure, since we show 
that institutional directors cannot be considered a uniform group: pressure-resistant and 
pressure-sensitive institutional directors behave differently with respect to CSR reporting. 
Third, we support the thesis that directors who are oriented towards the long term, such as 
pressure-resistant directors, are more likely to promote CSR disclosure, given the active 
monitoring role they play and because they are concerned about their reputation. Finally, our 
analysis provides an index that measures the level of CSR disclosure of a company, and this 
may be useful for NGOs, CSR observers, practitioners and researchers in determining which 
firms are more proactive in disclosing information on CSR. 
The paper proceeds as follows: in section 2, we focus on the institutional setting; 
section 3 describes the theoretical background and develops the hypotheses; section 4 
describes the sample, methodology and variables used in the study; section 5 provides the 
analysis of the findings; and the final section discusses the findings and conclusions, the 
limitations inherent to this study and future lines of research. 
2. INSTITUTIONAL SETTING 
In the last few decades, Spain has increased its interest in CSR policies because 
society is pressing companies to engage in sustainable production. For this reason, a growing 
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number of CSR reports, guidelines, observers, studies, indicators and indexes have exerted an 
influence in changing Spanish business culture. 
The Spanish Conthe Code (CUBG), issued in 2006, is a key aspect of this change. The 
Conthe Code (CUBG, 2006) provides three specific recommendations concerning CSR. The 
first makes reference to the inclusion of CSR disclosure in the corporate governance rules and 
internal codes of conduct, and states that this is supervised by a committee. The second refers 
to the minimum subject matter to be included in the CSR disclosure. In particular, the CSR 
disclosure should include details of specific practices on issues related to shareholders, 
employees, customers, suppliers, social and environmental matters, diversity, fiscal 
responsibility, respect for human rights and prevention of illegal behavior, and monitoring 
mechanisms for financial risk, ethics and business conduct. The third states that CSR issues 
should be reported in the management report, or in a separate report, using any of the different 
internationally accepted methodologies.  
The most relevant features of Spanish corporate governance are the low level of board 
independence, the lack of active market control (the supervision of the capital markets by the 
government and financial authorities is weak because the most important source of finance for 
companies is the banking sector, and not the capital markets), the presence of dominant 
shareholders on boards, a high ownership concentration and family ownership, a one-tier 
board system (all the directors, both executive and non-executive, sit on the board) and a low 
level of legal protection for investors. In this context, dominant shareholders take important 
positions on the boards of Spanish listed firms, and exert a strong influence on the 
management because of the high ownership concentration and the weakness of investors’ 
protection. Institutional investors are among the most important controlling shareholders in 
Spain and, consequently, they have an important influence on corporate governance (e.g., 
Crespí et al., 2004). Indeed, the boards of Spanish listed firms are characterized by the fact 
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that 40% of directors are institutional directors appointed by institutional investors; this is the 
highest percentage among European countries (Heidrick and Struggles, 2011).  
Thus, Spain offers a good setting in which to examine the role played by institutional 
directors, given their relevant presence on boards and given the little empirical evidence about 
the influence of institutional investors on CSR disclosure when they act as board directors, 
perhaps because the presence of institutional directors on boards appointed by institutional 
investors in the US and UK is less common.  
3. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES 
Stakeholder theory posits that a company should consider all the stakeholders that may 
affect or be affected by its activities (Freeman, 2010). This theory supports a link between 
business ethics and organizational management, as a result of which firms have to take into 
account not only their shareholders, but also a wider range of stakeholders, such as customers, 
the local community, and their employees, among others. Therefore, firms have to pay 
attention not only to their economic responsibilities, but also to the stakeholders’ interests.  
Most sustainable management research is based on the stakeholder perspective (e.g., 
Montiel and Delgado-Ceballos, 2014). To the extent that boards are responsible for setting the 
values and standards within their organizations, companies interested in integrating CSR 
policies and addressing the interests of different stakeholders may have to adapt their board 
composition and functioning to this new role. Authors such as Arjoon (2005) support the 
notion that directors have to demonstrate greater ethical responsibility and a stronger ethical 
attitude when conducting business than when they are not directors, because they represent 
not only the shareholders, but also the other stakeholders of the firm, and because society is 
putting pressure on them following the numerous scandals that came to light in the wake of 
the economic crisis. Walls et al. (2012) also stress the role of boards in relation to 
environmental performance, measured in two ways – as the addition of the values of the items 
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of strength or as the addition of the values of the items of concern. In particular, they report 
that environmental performance is better if the board is more diverse, less independent and 
smaller. Thus, boards meeting these conditions are effective monitoring tools for 
environmental performance. In the same vein, Walls and Hoffman (2013) highlight the 
importance of the board of directors in supervising managers and affecting the firm’s strategic 
orientation. These authors show that boards with greater environmental experience are more 
likely to diverge in a positive direction from institutional norms. Jain and Jamali (2016) argue 
that the board of directors is a “rich source of knowledge and guidance” and can, therefore, 
challenge managers to implement certain actions promoting the firm’s CSR.  
Galbreath (2016) posits that directors on boards are supposed to move towards the 
promotion of actions associated with CSR. Concretely, Galbreath (2016) proposes that board 
composition is a very important issue when a firm’s CSR is explored, since board members 
are a heterogeneous group because of their differing incentives and temporal orientations. The 
author finds that insider directors show a short-term orientation that is contrary to the long-
term orientation needed for CSR and, thus, that insiders have a negative impact on CSR 
reporting.  
In continental European countries, particularly Spain, where listed firms are 
characterized by high ownership concentration, two types of directors are distinguished in 
their boards of directors: insiders (executive) and outsiders or non-executive. Executive 
directors are vested with wide managerial powers and guide the firm’s management team, 
while non-executive directors are mainly tasked with monitoring functions. The boards tend 
to be numerous, mainly in big companies, and among non-executive directors, two kinds of 
directors can be considered: those representing the owners or controlling shareholders 
(institutional directors) and independent directors (a more detailed discussion of this matter 
can be found in Ferrarini and Felippelli, 2013). Whereas executive directors are insiders and 
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are directly involved in the management of the firm, both independent and institutional 
directors are considered outsiders, with different agendas and incentives in terms of 
controlling managers. In this sense, independent directors are members who are “free of any 
business, family or other relationship with the company, its controlling shareholder or the 
management of either, that creates a conflict of interest such as to impair its judgment” (EU, 
2005). Furthermore, independent directors are board members appointed in view of their 
recognized professional expertise, experience and prestige and are neither executive nor 
institutional directors, while institutional directors are those members who represent dominant 
institutional investors in the company that are involved somehow with the company and can 
influence the management of the firm.  
Institutional directors have received attention from previous empirical research (e.g., 
Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003; López-Iturriaga et al., 2015). Authors such as Hartzell and 
Starks (2003) suggest that institutional investors perform a relevant monitoring role and 
Parrino et al. (2003) emphasize their capacity to discipline managers and their active behavior 
in response to the corporate governance problems of firms. These characteristics involve an 
activism that is known as institutional shareholder activism. In this regard, Eesley et al. 
(2016) show that the activism of investors, such as institutional investors, is an important 
matter to take into account when examining social changes in companies, since these 
investors may press firms to report CSR information. Thus, it is logical to assume that firms 
with institutional directors on their boards are more likely to be transparent and, hence, to 
encourage CSR reporting, as the costs associated with the monitoring role of institutional 
directors will be lower in companies that disclose CSR issues. Furthermore, institutional 
directors tend to be more aware of social and environmental demands, taking responsibility in 
these areas (Harjoto and Jo, 2011). In other words, these directors take an active role and, 
thus, may influence CSR reporting as they are interested in their reputation.  
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Furthermore, continental European base research, especially that conducted in Spain 
(e.g., García-Meca and Sánchez-Ballesta, 2009; Pucheta-Martínez and García-Meca, 2014), 
shows that independent directors on boards, in contrast to the US and UK, appear to be less 
effective in carrying out the theoretical role of monitoring and, therefore, the supervising role 
on boards is not played by independent directors, but by directors who represent controlling 
shareholders such as institutional investors.  
Agency theory argues that institutional directors have incentives to act independently 
of managers and, therefore, will protect the interests of all the stakeholders, particularly 
shareholders, to mitigate agency costs (Colpan and Yoshikawa, 2012). Institutional directors 
should react to the expectations of the stakeholders, and institutional directors would therefore 
be expected to be more committed to CSR reporting demands, given that it might reinforce 
the internal control of companies and might decrease opportunistic behaviors due to 
asymmetric information, as Frías-Aceituno et al. (2013) suggest. Furthermore, CSR disclosure 
is a long-term responsibility of a firm and, accordingly, companies with institutional directors, 
who are usually associated with a long-term orientation, will have an interest in the long-term 
sustainability of the company and will be more likely to disclose CSR issues because they are 
necessary for long-term value creation and sustainable firm performance (Mahapatra, 1984). 
In this vein, the prior literature (e.g., Zattoni, 2011) shows that institutional directors exert a 
positive impact on CSR disclosure.  
Likewise, from a legitimacy perspective, firms need to be legitimated by society 
(Patten and Crampton, 2004) in order to successfully run the business. If society notices that 
firms behave in an inappropriate manner, such legitimacy can be threatened, so in order to 
guarantee it, firms carry out legitimation strategies such as CSR reporting. In this regards, 
CSR disclosure becomes a mechanism for acquiring legitimacy and for protecting a firm’s 
identity and reputation (Panwar et al., 2014). As a result, given that institutional directors are 
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concerned with their reputation, they will be more likely to disclose CSR information. 
Additionally, CSR disclosure is viewed by institutional directors as crucial to attain 
competitive advantage and sustainability, as it can help companies achieve legitimacy through 
support from different stakeholders (Neubaum and Zahra, 2006).  
In line with agency and legitimacy approaches, the signaling perspective posits that in 
situations of asymmetric information, firms signal efforts to disclose sustainability matters in 
order to reduce this asymmetry and to assure legitimacy in society (Connelly et al., 2010). 
CSR and sustainability issues may be viewed as such asymmetric information because not all 
stakeholders have access to this type of information. Hence, institutional directors will 
support decisions such as CSR disclosure in order to send signals to stakeholders. In this way, 
institutional directors may send a signal to third parties communicating companies’ 
unobservable features, such as their commitment to environmental and social matters, thus 
preserving their reputation. Additionally, if stakeholders value these unobservable 
characteristics, they might reward firms (Ramchander et al., 2012).  
Based on the above arguments, we posit the following hypothesis: 
H1: CSR disclosure is positively affected by institutional directors. 
As stressed above, institutional directors (those who represent institutional investors 
on boards) are considered to be a heterogeneous group since their interests and incentives are 
dissimilar. In line with this, earlier research (e.g., Ramalingegowda and Yu, 2012) shows that 
institutional directors do not behave in a monolithic way, as they represent institutional 
investors who may or may not maintain business ties with the firm in which they invest and, 
thus, they may have different attitudes with regard to anti-takeover amendments, CEO 
compensation and CSR disclosure, inter alia. Such directors can be separated into two groups: 
pressure-sensitive institutional directors (those representing banks and insurance firms, who 
both invest in the firm and maintain commercial ties with it) and pressure-resistant 
14	
institutional directors (those representing mutual funds, investment funds, pension funds and 
venture capital firms, who only invest in the firm). Huse (2007) also argues that the impact of 
institutional directors on boards depends on the type of ownership that they represent in 
companies. In this sense, while pressure-resistant institutional investors are oriented towards 
the long term, pressure-sensitive institutional investors are oriented towards the short term. 
The long-term orientation of pressure-resistant directors may explain why they are concerned 
about their reputation and, consequently, why they are more likely to reduce agency problems 
and to encourage social issues such as CSR disclosure. On the other hand, maximizing 
corporate performance and the expansion of their own businesses in order to achieve greater 
benefit are the results of the short-term orientation of pressure-sensitive directors. Their 
commercial ties with the firm may cause them conflicts of interest and, therefore, they will be 
less likely to encourage changes or to mitigate agency costs. Hence, the temporal horizon will 
determine the behavior of both types of institutional directors in their supervision of the 
management team in relation to reducing agency problems and disclosing CSR information. 
This idea is supported by Jain and Jamali (2016), who argue that pressure-sensitive investors 
such as banks have a short-term investment perspective and will be less interested in 
supporting CSR activities because these practices show their benefits in a long-term horizon; 
thus, pressure-sensitive investors consider the costs of CSR activities unnecessary. 
Meanwhile, pension funds (pressure-resistant investors) will be more likely to support CSR 
firms’ disclosure because they have a long-term investment approach (more detail about this 
point can be found in Jain and Jamali’s 2016 paper).  
Pressure-sensitive institutional investors, as underlined above, tend to maintain both 
business and investment links with companies and, in order to preserve their business ties, 
may not be disposed to take issue with management decisions. Thus, because their 
profitability depends on it, pressure-sensitive institutional investors will tend to maintain a 
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solid and excellent relationship with the firm. This view is supported by Almazán et al. 
(2005), who show that pressure-resistant directors can provide more intense managerial 
monitoring than pressure-sensitive investors because they are more active. According to Huse 
(2007), when pressure-sensitive institutional directors dominate the board, it will tend to align 
with managers rather than to control them.  
The prior literature (e.g., Almazán et al., 2005; David et al., 1998) emphasizes the 
hypothesis that banks and insurance companies seek their own profit because of the design of 
their incentive systems. In this vein, Johnson and Greening (1999) find that pressure-sensitive 
institutional directors will try to put pressure on the company to adopt a short-term 
orientation, given their short-term profitability perspective. Hence, these authors suggest that 
such directors face more conflicts of interest in their relationship with the firm; thus, they will 
be less concerned about monitoring managers or CSR matters, for example. This idea is 
consistent with those of Eng (1999), who reports that insurance companies have a short-term 
horizon and, consequently, may not be interested in safeguarding the interests of stakeholders.  
Within the category of pressure-sensitive institutional investors, banks are the most 
common, and pressure-sensitive institutional investors may, thus, become both shareholders 
and creditors. They may perceive that this dual role gives them access to more information 
than other types of shareholder, and they may use this information for their own interests. 
This may encourage the formation of controlling coalitions between such types of institutional 
investor and managers or other stakeholders, creating corporate groups to extract private 
benefits (Ali et al., 2007). Pressure-sensitive institutional directors will be less effective in 
monitoring managers, since they can be expected to align themselves with managers as they 
do not want to lose their business or potential business. Therefore, pressure-sensitive 
institutional directors may behave in the interests of those whom they represent, and not in the 
interests of the company’s stakeholders. As a result, they will be less likely to require the 
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disclosure of CSR information. This suggests a negative association between pressure-
sensitive institutional directors and CSR disclosure, consistent with the collusion hypothesis, 
which argues that some directors may have incentives to collude with managers. This 
negative association would mean that pressure-sensitive institutional directors would not press 
managers to be involved with CSR reporting.  
On the other hand, pressure-resistant directors, who represent institutional investors 
with no business links but only investment ties to the firm and may be mutual funds, 
investment funds, pension funds or venture capital firms, play a monitoring and disciplinary 
role on boards (López-Iturriaga et al., 2015). In contrast to pressure-sensitive institutional 
directors, pressure-resistant directors do not face a conflict of interests, as those they represent 
do not maintain any business relationship with the firm. Accordingly, these directors are able 
to discipline managers. Furthermore, Finkelstein (1992) argues that public pension funds and 
mutual funds, among others, have no “fear of retribution” from the firm’s managers because 
they can be involved in corporate governance matters without being influenced by them. 
Pressure-resistant institutional directors will prefer sustainable firms because the costs 
associated with monitoring the managers of such firms are lower. Furthermore, Johnson and 
Greening (1999) find that pressure-resistant institutional directors have a positive effect on 
CSR issues. More concretely, these authors provide evidence that pension funds have a 
positive impact on product quality (which includes the environment), the community, human 
talent matters, gender diversity and minorities. Given that the benefits related to CSR 
disclosure are derived in the long term, and pressure-resistant directors on boards are 
characterized by a long-term horizon, the integration between these directors and CSR 
disclosure is relevant. This argument is also supported by Sethi (2005), who shows that 
pension funds perform a very relevant role in corporate governance, as they try to ensure that 
firms have a long-term perspective, which may encourage more CSR firms’ disclosure.  
17	
Furthermore, Cotter and Najah (2012) provide evidence that large institutional 
investors, such as pension funds, press firms on climate change issues. According to this 
evidence, the pressure exerted by their stakeholders means that firms must be concerned about 
CSR matters if they are to be competitive. Consequently, we expect that pressure-resistant 
institutional directors will have a positive impact on CSR disclosure, in line with the 
supervision (contest or monitoring) hypothesis, which argues that some directors have the 
motivation to supervise the management team. Such directors will be concerned for their 
reputation and, accordingly, will persuade the management to report on CSR issues.  
Consequently, we posit the following two hypotheses:  
H2: CSR disclosure is negatively affected by pressure-sensitive institutional directors.  
H3: CSR disclosure is positively affected by pressure-resistant institutional directors. 
4. EMPIRICAL DESIGN 
4.1 Sample 
Our sample consists of listed Spanish non-financial firms from 2004 to 2013. 
Financial entities have been excluded from the sample for several reasons: (1) because they 
are under special scrutiny by financial authorities that constrain the role of their board of 
directors and (2) due to the special accounting principles and rules that they have to comply 
with when preparing their financial statements, which make it more difficult to compare them 
with those of non-financial firms since they are not homogenous. Our final sample, after 
excluding financial entities, is composed of an unbalanced panel dataset of 1,018 firm-year 
observations. Our panel is unbalanced because during the period of the study some companies 
were acquired or merged and, consequently, were de-listed, while other companies went 
bankrupt or became public companies. According to Arellano (2003), the findings provided 
by an unbalanced panel are as reliable as those reported for a balanced panel and, therefore, 
there is no concern regarding bias derived from missing data. 
18	
The information used to construct the CSR index was collected from web pages of 
firms (annual sustainability reports) and the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) website, on 
which the annual GRI report of companies that have voluntarily disclosed CSR information 
can be found. Financial data (total assets, total debts and earnings before interest and taxation 
for measuring the variables leverage, return on assets and firm size) were collected from the 
financial statements, and corporate governance data (the proportion of institutional, pressure-
sensitive and pressure-resistant directors, the proportion of stocks owned by insiders, board 
independence and board size) were obtained from the annual corporate governance reports. 
Sector data were also collected from the financial reports. Both financial and corporate 
governance reports must be annually disclosed by listed firms in the Public Register of the 
Spanish Securities Market Commission (CNMV).  
4.2 Variables 
Our dependent variable, CSR disclosure or reporting, is defined as the CSR_Index and 
is created using social, environmental and stakeholder information, since CSR is a 
multidimensional concept (Peloza and Shang, 2011). We base our CSR_Index on Cuadrado-
Ballestero et al. (2015), who focus on the three types of information mentioned above to 
construct their CSR disclosure measure, which is also consistent with the recent papers of 
Jaggi et al. (2017) and Liu and Zhang (2017), who analyze the voluntary disclosure of carbon 
information among Italian firms and of CSR information among Chinese companies, 
respectively. In line with these papers, we also employ content analysis to capture CSR 
information.  
We examine the three matters mentioned above as follows. First, we consider the 
social information reported by Spanish listed companies. Thus, we analyze information in 
sustainability reports regarding social labor performed by firms, using their resources (such as 
financial or human resources) to alleviate social problems or to help underprivileged social 
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groups. In this vein, some companies may, for example, allocate a percentage of their profits 
to social activities or allow employees to dedicate part of their time to cooperating with NGOs 
without reducing their salaries. Secondly, we analyze the environmental information disclosed 
by the listed firms, taking into account whether they disclose information in their 
sustainability reports about the impact of their activities on the environment and how they 
alter their activities if they do affect the environment, their environmental management 
system and their policies and environmental commitments. Finally, regarding stakeholder 
information disclosure, we bear in mind the level of commitment undertaken by the firm. In 
relation to this, we explore issues such as management systems for general interest groups, 
gender diversity, development of employees, human rights matters and relationships with 
customers and suppliers. To the best of our knowledge, no prior research conducted with 
Spanish listed firms has, in contrast to our analysis, considered all economic sectors in order 
to construct the CSR disclosure measure.  
For each area (social, environmental and stakeholder information), a company is 
awarded one point if it gives complete information (meaning that the company reports 
information on every item we have considered for that particular area). If a company does not 
disclose any information about the areas we take into account, it receives zero points. A 
company receives half a point if it partially discloses information. For instance, if in the 
environmental area we take into account four items and the firm discloses information about 
one, two or three of them, this is considered partial disclosure. 
Thus, the CSR_Index is calculated as follows:  
!"#_%&'()
= ∑	(./01(	.0/234	31(3 + ./01(	(&6210&7(&834	31(3 + ./01(	.839(ℎ04'(1.	31(3)3  
As can be seen, we divide the total score for the firm by 3, which is the maximum 
score that a firm can attain.  
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Then, using the CSR_Index, we classify the firms in the following way: if a firm has a 
CSR_Index of 0, the firm’s CSR disclosure is null; a CSR_Index between 0.1 and 0.5 means 
that the firm’s CSR disclosure is moderate; a CSR_Index between 0.6 and 0.9 represents an 
acceptable level for the firm’s CSR disclosure; and a CSR_Index equal to 1 indicates that the 
firm’s CSR disclosure is complete in respect of the issues we take into account. 
Some authors, such as Kim and Lyon (2011), Lyon and Maxwell (2011) and Marquis 
et al. (2016), base their investigations on selective environmental disclosure or, in other 
words, on how companies can create a false good image by divulging their positive actions, 
while hiding their negative impacts on the environment. Toffel (2005) explores why firms 
voluntarily report regulatory environmental violations, while Reid and Toffel (2009) examine 
how companies behave under shareholder activism that respects the disclosure of corporate 
social actions, specifically considering the disclosure of information focused on climate 
change strategies. Kayser et al. (2014) analyze whether firms voluntarily join environmental 
and social programs with lax access conditions. More precisely, they analyze whether 
stakeholder scrutiny encourages companies to participate in the Global Compact program 
when their prior practices are consistent with the program’s principles. In comparison to these 
papers based on environmental issues, our measure is more complete since it not only takes 
into account the disclosure of environmental information, but also considers social and 
stakeholder information reported by the firms. In this way, our index provides a new insight 
into all the information disclosed by Spanish listed firms on CSR matters.  
Several independent variables are used. The variable for the percentage of institutional 
directors, defined as INST, is calculated as the number of institutional directors on the board 
of directors as a percentage of the total number of board members. We also consider the 
representatives of pressure-sensitive and pressure-resistant institutional investors, i.e. 
pressure-sensitive and pressure-resistant directors, respectively. We label the pressure-
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sensitive directors as SENSIT, and pressure-resistant directors as RESIST, and these variables 
are calculated as the total number of pressure-sensitive directors on the board as a percentage 
of the total number of board members, and the total number of pressure-resistant directors on 
the board as a percentage of the total number of board members, respectively.  
Regarding control variables, we consider several factors that may affect the 
CSR_Index. First, we control for board independence (BINDEP), which is the total number of 
independent directors on the board as a percentage of the total number of board members. 
Hence, we expect a positive sign between BINDEP and CSR reporting. Second, leverage 
(LEV) is measured as the ratio of the book value of debt to the total assets. We predict a 
positive sign for this variable. Third, we control for profitability or performance, defined as 
the return on assets (ROA), and calculate this as the ratio of earnings before interest and 
taxation (EBIT) to book assets. We expect a positive sign for ROA. Fourth, we control for 
firm size, labeled as SIZE, and measure as the log of the total assets (expressed in thousands 
of Euros). Consistent with Aragon-Correa et al. (2013), we predict a positive association 
between SIZE and CSR reporting. Fifth, we consider board size (BSIZE), measured as the 
total number of board members. De Villiers et al. (2011) show a positive relationship between 
board size and CSR disclosure. Another control variable considered is insider ownership 
(INSOWN), calculated as the proportion of stocks held by inside directors. In line with 
Harjoto and Jo (2011), we predict a negative association between insider ownership and CSR 
disclosure. We control for the sector, calculated as a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if 
the firm belongs to the particular sector analyzed and 0, otherwise. Here, we draw on the 
CNMV classification, which considers the following sectors (labels given in parentheses): 
transport (TR) (the reference category); cement, glass and construction materials (CGCM); 
commerce and other services (COMER); construction (CONST); energy and water (EW); 
financial and insurance (FININS); chemical industry (CHIN); real estate (RE); mass media 
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(MASSM); basic metal industries (BMI); other processing industries (OPI); metal processing 
industries (MPI) and, finally, the remaining sectors not included in any of the above 
categories and that consist of few firms (OTHR). According to García-Ayuso and Larrinaga 
(2003), some sectors are more likely to report CSR information than others, as their activities 
have a greater impact on society. Finally, we also control for firm and year fixed effects.  
5. RESULTS  
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for all the variables. The data show that the 
CSR_Index is, on average, 0.382 out of 1 and, therefore, that the firms in our sample are 
moderate disclosers of CSR information. Furthermore, the statistics show that, on average, 
32.38% of the directors on a board are institutional, with pressure-sensitive and pressure-
resistant institutional directors accounting for 6.23% and 26.15%, respectively. In addition, 
31.91% of the directors are independent directors, on average, and the mean for insider 
ownership is 8.72%. Furthermore, the average firm size (the log of the total assets in 
thousands of Euros) is 13.25, the average leverage is 52.34%, the average board size is 10.77 
members and the average ROA is 3.55%. Finally, the transport sector accounts for 3.34% of 
firms, cement, glass and construction materials 2.94%, commerce and other services 10.61%, 
construction 7.95%, energy and water 7.76%, the financial and insurance sector 2.85%, the 
chemical industry 3.14%, real estate 11.59%, mass media 3.73%, basic metal industries 
4.32%, other processing industries 2.41%, metal processing industries 9.82% and other 
sectors 7.76%. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
5.2 Multivariate analysis  
The correlation matrix has been calculated to test for multicollinearity. The findings, 
unreported for the sake of brevity, show that all the coefficients are lower than 0.7, except for 
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the pairs INST and RESIST, but this is not a problem because these variables do not interact 
together in any model. However, Hair et al. (2006:227) suggest that the correlation matrix is 
not sufficient to check the lack of high correlation values among variables to evaluate the 
presence of multicollinearity. Accordingly, as Hair et al. (2006) indicate, we have also 
calculated the variance inflation factor (VIF) and the tolerance (1/VIF), provided in Table 2, 
where the regression findings are presented. According to Haan (2002), VIFs higher than 10 
show multicollinearity concerns. In this study, the highest VIF is 7.21 and, therefore 
multicollinearity is not a problem.  
For estimating the models, we use a Tobit regression because this is designed to 
estimate linear relationships between variables when there is either left- or right-censoring in 
the dependent variable. In this paper, the dependent variable, CSR_Index, is either 0 or a 
positive number and ranges from 0 to 1. Thus, given that the variable is censored on two sides 
[0–1], a Tobit regression is most suitable for handling the data. All the assumptions for a 
Tobit regression are fulfilled. According to Wooldridge (2010), the Tobit model with panel 
data can be estimated as a pooled or a random effects regression. The likelihood-ratio test of 
rho=0 allows us to discriminate between pooled or random effects (Flanagan, 2004). Our 
findings of the likelihood-ratio test show that a random effects estimator is more appropriate 
than a pooled one. Furthermore, we have performed the likelihood-ratio test for 
heteroskedasticity and the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data models. While the 
likelihood-ratio test shows that heteroskedasticity is not a concern in our model, the 
Wooldridge test finds that autocorrelation is. Thus, autocorrelation problems have been 
corrected by using the bootstrap standard errors method, which clusters residual standard 
errors (e.g., Gaynor et al., 2006). 
Table 2 shows the results for Model 1, in which the effect of institutional directors on 
the CSR_Index is analyzed. As expected, the proportion of institutional directors exhibits a 
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positive sign, and this is statistically significant. Thus, the first hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
Our results suggest that institutional directors on boards have a positive impact on CSR 
disclosure; this is consistent with the findings of authors such as Cox et al. (2004), Neubaum 
and Zahra (2006) and Zattoni (2011), who find a positive relationship between institutional 
directors and CSR matters. In this vein, our findings reinforce the argument that institutional 
directors have a long-term horizon, play an effective monitoring role in relation to managers 
and are concerned about their reputation; for these reasons, they press managers to disclose 
CSR information. This evidence supports the supervision hypothesis, because institutional 
directors will prefer companies that are more involved with CSR disclosure in order to 
monitor the managers more efficiently. Therefore, firms with more institutional directors on 
their boards are more likely to report CSR information. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Table 2 also reports the findings for Models 2 and 3, in which we analyze how 
pressure-sensitive institutional directors and pressure-resistant institutional directors, 
respectively, affect CSR reporting.  
Model 2 in Table 2 shows that the percentage of pressure-sensitive institutional 
directors, as predicted, shows a negative sign; however, this result is insignificant. Thus, we 
reject the second hypothesis. Consequently, this finding suggests that pressure-sensitive 
institutional directors do not have an impact on CSR reporting, and this result is in line with 
the findings of Johnson and Greening (1999), who found that pressure-sensitive institutional 
directors did not have an effect on CSR disclosure. However, our results, contrary to our 
expectations, do not support the collusion hypothesis for this type of director. According to 
Johnson and Greening (1999), the fact that these directors frequently change their portfolios, 
and that the long-term profits derived from firms’ CSR activities are not of interest to them, 
may explain the lack of impact of pressure-sensitive institutional directors on CSR disclosure.  
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Model 3 in Table 2 reports that the proportion of pressure-resistant institutional 
directors exhibits a positive sign, as predicted. Moreover, this result is statistically significant. 
Hence, the third hypothesis cannot be rejected. Accordingly, our findings suggest that 
pressure-resistant institutional directors have a positive effect on CSR disclosure, which is in 
line with the findings of Johnson and Greening (1999) suggesting that pressure-resistant 
institutional directors are more likely to encourage the disclosure of social, stakeholder and 
environmental information. This evidence supports the idea that pressure-resistant 
institutional directors prefer firms that are more committed to CSR reporting because the 
costs associated with monitoring managers in such firms are lower. In addition, pressure-
resistant directors are concerned with their reputation, have a long-term perspective and prefer 
firms that are more involved with CSR matters. This result supports the thesis that pressure-
resistant institutional directors have incentives to encourage managers to disclose information 
about CSR activities, which is consistent with the results of Sethi (2005) and with the 
monitoring hypothesis.  
Concerning the control variables, board independence (BINDEP) and firm size (SIZE) 
are positive and statistically associated with CSR disclosure in all models displayed in Table 
2. The control variable insider ownership (INSOWN) shows a negative sign, according to our 
expectations, and this is statistically significant in all models. Finally, our findings 
demonstrate which sectors disclose more or less CSR information compared to the transport 
sector (TR – the reference category). In particular, compared to TR, the construction 
(CONST) and basic metal industries (BMI) sectors show a positive sign on CSR disclosure, 
and the results are statistically significant. The commerce and other services (COMER), the 
energy and water (EW), the mass media (MASSM) and other processing industries (OPI) 
sectors also present a positive sign in comparison to the transport sector, but the findings 
show that the COMER, MASSM and OPI sectors are only statistically significant in Models 1 
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and 3 and for the EW sector in Model 1. Therefore, the aforementioned sectors positively 
affect CSR reporting, which is a logical consequence of the high environmental and social 
impact of their activities. Thus, compared to the transport sector, all these sectors disclose 
more CSR information. By contrast, compared to TR, the real estate (RE) sector is negatively 
associated with CSR reporting in a statistically significant way, which implies that the real 
sector reports less CSR information than the transport sector. The remaining variables are 
insignificant.  
We also address the issue of possible endogeneity between our independent variables 
(INST, SENSIT and RESIST) and CSR disclosure. The direction of causality between the 
independent variables and CSR reporting is more likely to go from the directors analyzed in 
the paper to CSR disclosure, although it is also likely that CSR disclosure has an effect on 
board composition. This matter is addressed by lagging the independent variables in our 
models. For the sake of brevity, these findings are not shown, but they are in line with the 
core results of our analysis.  
5.3 Sensitivity analysis 
We check the robustness of our models using, as the dependent variable, the ratio 
between the CSR_Index and the firm size (SIZE), since firm size is a factor that has a positive 
effect on CSR reporting, as our results show: bigger companies are more likely to disclose 
CSR information than smaller ones. The results, which for the sake of brevity are not 
provided, demonstrate that the proportions of institutional directors (INST) and pressure-
resistant institutional directors (RESIST) exhibit a positive sign, as expected, and are 
statistically significant. Regarding pressure-sensitive institutional directors (SENSIT), the 
results are insignificant. Hence, this evidence corroborates our results and, accordingly, we 
can affirm that our findings do not depend on the measure of CSR reporting.  
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6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Our paper tries to fill the gap in the literature concerning the role played by 
institutional directors in firms’ decision-making processes in relation to CSR disclosure. To 
deepen the analysis of institutional directors and their impact on CSR disclosure, we also 
distinguish between institutional directors who represent institutional investors with business 
ties to the company and institutional directors who represent institutional investors that do not 
maintain such business links. 
Our results reveal that institutional and pressure-resistant directors have a positive 
effect on CSR disclosure. This finding supports the monitoring hypothesis, stressing the 
importance of reputation for these directors, in line with their long-term perspective. Their 
preferences for long-term investments and for mitigating agency costs support the view that 
institutional and pressure-resistant directors may have sufficient power to supervise managers 
and activities, to reduce opportunistic behavior, to influence company decisions in favor of 
stakeholders’ interests, and to foster changes in companies such as the widening of CSR 
reporting to include not only economic matters, but also social and environmental ones. In 
this vein, it will be more complicated for managers to collude with institutional and pressure-
resistant directors than with other directors since these institutional directors might be 
interested in sharing supervision costs, resulting in a more active and efficient supervisory 
role. Furthermore, institutional and pressure-resistant directors on boards may avoid the 
temptation to join other institutional and pressure-sensitive directors in taking part in 
tunneling activities (that is, expropriating wealth from minority owners), since managers 
might influence them to gain their support and, in return, these directors might meet their 
aims. The more active supervision of managers’ activities by these directors might prevent 
tunneling activities and might challenge the boards of directors and managers to disclose CSR 
issues. This is because institutional and pressure-resistant directors may link the competitive 
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advantages with the benefits provided by CSR; this will lead to the long-term sustainability of 
the company and an improvement in company performance. Provided that pressure-resistant 
directors represent institutional investors who do not maintain commercial ties with the firms, 
they do not face any conflicts of interest arising from such business relationships and, 
consequently, they can behave in a more independent way. The firms in which the investors 
have invested can exert less pressure on such directors.  
Contrary to our expectations, pressure-sensitive institutional directors do not have an 
impact on CSR disclosure, suggesting that banks and insurance companies hold short-term 
positions and, thus, simply seek to enhance their own profit. This result may be explained by 
arguing that supervision costs are high and that pressure-sensitive directors would have to 
bear these costs if they engaged in supervision, while sharing the benefits of the supervision 
with all the other stakeholders. This will discourage pressure-sensitive directors from 
becoming involved with monitoring any activities that could increase the CSR reporting. 
Moreover, pressure-sensitive directors might influence the decision-making process for their 
own benefit, and in order to achieve their own aims they might prefer to align themselves 
with the company. Thus, it is reasonable to suggest that pressure-sensitive directors may be 
interested in taking part in tunneling activities rather than supervision activities. 
Consequently, pressure-sensitive directors might not be interested in promoting CSR 
reporting, even though CSR disclosure may increase firm value. Following this line of 
argument, pressure-sensitive directors will be more interested in obtaining private benefits for 
the investors they represent than in enhancing firm performance, and more interested in 
monitoring other pressure-sensitive directors in order to prevent them from achieving their 
own purposes. Pressure-sensitive directors will align themselves with managers and will be 
less willing to confront them with CSR reporting; this is a result of the conflicts of interest 
faced by pressure-sensitive institutional directors because of the business ties between the 
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firm and the pressure-sensitive institutional investors they represent. If these directors do not 
align themselves with managers, they might compromise these commercial links. Hence, 
pressure-sensitive directors may collude with managers, aligning themselves with their views 
and decisions, such as decisions not to disclose CSR information, and in this way, pressure-
sensitive directors may meet their own aims and preserve the commercial relationships. 
Additionally, pressure-sensitive directors tend to be interested in short-term earnings and, 
consequently, may support activities that increase short-term profitability; CSR reporting is 
not one of these activities because its benefits are displayed across a long-term horizon. Thus, 
the supervision costs, the conflict of interest felt by pressure-sensitive directors and these 
directors’ short-term orientation support the absence of influence of these directors on CSR 
disclosure. 
This research has significant implications. Our results offer a new insight into the 
positive role played by institutional directors, particularly pressure-resistant directors, on CSR 
disclosure and may, therefore, help policymakers to promote CSR reporting in the Spanish 
context, where almost 40% of board members are institutional directors. Hence, this result has 
important implications for both public policy and the governance of firms. When there are 
differences between institutional directors, especially pressure-resistant directors, and other 
experienced directors, then the interests of the institutional directors would mainly become a 
public policy matter. Regulatory bodies may recommend board structures with institutional 
directors, particularly pressure-resistant directors, not only for listed firms, but also for non-
listed firms, since institutional directorship might encourage firms to disclose CSR 
information, which may be of benefit to all the stakeholders. Non-compliance with these 
recommendations may be perceived negatively by the capital markets and other funding 
sources, which may encourage companies to disclose CSR information. Secondly, our results 
suggest that institutional directors and pressure-resistant directors may challenge boards and 
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managers to report on CSR issues, in line with the monitoring hypothesis and, consequently, 
these directors focus not only on economic performance, but also on environmental and social 
matters. Accordingly, this evidence supports the view that institutional directors and pressure-
resistant directors might actively supervise managers and might abandon their conventional 
inactive role in the supervision of managers, which would have an effect on CSR reporting. 
Thirdly, our findings offer important evidence in relation to earlier literature by examining 
whether institutional investors, when they appoint board directors, have an effect on CSR 
reporting. As a result, when academics examine the role played by institutional investors, they 
should address not only the number of shares held by institutional investors, but also their 
contribution to other methods of corporate control such as board membership. Fourthly, our 
evidence demonstrates that institutional directors should be considered as a heterogeneous 
group, because pressure-resistant directors have a positive impact on CSR reporting, while 
pressure-sensitive directors do not have any effect. Fifthly, this paper provides new insights 
for NGOs, which may consider our evidence when they help companies to get a better 
understanding of the importance of institutional directors in firms’ decisions to disclose CSR 
information; such disclosures are in the interests of the institutional investors and of society, 
and they are of special benefit to all stakeholders. Finally, further investigations into the role 
of institutional directors become essential to give a better understanding of how they engage 
in efficient corporate governance mechanisms. Although earlier and more recent evidence has 
shed some light on these matters, academics must go even more deeply into the implications 
and incentives of institutional directors in the governance of firms.  
This research has several limitations. First, despite taking into account as many factors 
as possible on the basis of theory and the prior empirical evidence, it is likely that there are 
unknown factors affecting CSR disclosure that have not been considered. Second, our 
research is based on Spanish listed firms from 2004 to 2013 and, therefore, our findings 
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should not be extended to other periods. Third, although a significant percentage of directors 
on Spanish boards are institutional directors, within this category there are fewer pressure-
sensitive directors than pressure-resistant directors. Finally, our CSR_Index, based on the 
prior literature, is composed of three areas and is measured using many factors, but it is 
possible that other characteristics having an impact on the three areas of our analysis have not 
been addressed.  
Finally, this investigation leads to suggestions for future research. First, it may be 
interesting to analyze the role played by institutional directors in relation to CSR disclosure 
for Spanish financial entities, and for small to medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Secondly, it 
would also be interesting to explore whether there are institutional directors appointed by 
NGOs on the boards of listed and non-listed firms, and the role that these directors perform in 
relation to CSR reporting, given the work in society undertaken by NGOs. Finally, the 
number of female directors of listed firms is increasing, particularly in Spain, and 
consequently, the role played by female institutional directors in relation to CSR disclosure is 
also a relevant topic.  
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Main Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A. Continuous variables 
Variables N Mean Std. Dev. Perc. 25th Perc. 50th Perc. 75th 
CSR_Index 1.018 0.382 0.439 0.000 0.000 0.833 
INST 1.018 32.384 23.922 14.000 29.500 50.000 
SENSIT 1.018 6.233 11.359 0.000 0.000 10.000 
RESIST 1.018 26.151 23.983 0.000 20.000 44.000 
BINDEP 1.018 31.913 17.984 21.000 30.884 42.857 
LEV 1.018 52.344 23.583 34.352 54.852 70.150 
ROA 1.018 3.550 14.820 -0.834 3.227 8.343 
SIZE 1.018 13.249 1.803 11.897 13.089 14.476 
BSIZE 1.018 10.767 3.801 8.000 10.000 13.000 
INSOWN 1.018 8.719 17.274 0.000 0.103 8.452 
Panel B. Dummies variables 
   
% of firms of the sample 
that do not operate in the 
sector analysed  
% of firms of the 
sample that operate in 
the sector analysed 
TR  96.66%  3.34% 
CGCM  97.05%  2.94% 
COMER  89.39%  10.61% 
CONST  92.04%  7.95% 
EW  92.24%  7.76% 
FININS  97.15%  2.85% 
CHIN  96.86%  3.14% 
RE  88.41%  11.59% 
MASSM  96.27%  3.73% 
BMI  95.68%  4.32% 
OPI  97.59%  24,06% 
MPI  90.18%  9.82% 
OTHR  92.24%  7.76% 
Mean, standard deviation and percentiles 25th, 50th and 75th. Panel A and B show the continuous and dummy 
variables, respectively. CSR_Index is the dependent variable, measured as the sum of the score of the three 
areas analyzed divided by 3; INST is the proportion of institutional directors on board; SENSIT is the 
proportion of the board directors who are representative of pressure-sensitive institutional investors (i.e., 
banks and insurance companies); RESIST is the proportion of the board directors who are representative of 
pressure-resistant institutional investors (i.e., investment funds); INDEP is the proportion of independent 
directors on the board; BDSIZE is the number of directors on boards; LEV is the debt over total assets; ROA 
is the operate income before interests and taxes over total assets; SIZE is the log of total assets; BSIZE is the 
number of member on boards; INSOWN is the percentage of shares held by insiders (directors) on board and 
from TR to OTHR represent the sectors of the firms, measured as dummy variables that take the value 1 if 


















































Significant at *** for 99 percent confidence level, ** for 95 percent and * for 90 percent. 
 
Table 2 
Results of the Tobit regression for institutional, pressure-sensitive and pressure-resistant directors sit on boards 













INST + 0.004*         (0.096) 1.48 0.676       
SENSIT -    -0.006      
     (0.388) 1.25 0.799    RESIST +       0.006*   
        (0.091) 1.34 0.746 
BINDEP + 0.017***   0.013***   0.017***   (0.001) 1.47 0.678 (0.005) 1.27 0.785 (0.001) 1.39 0.719 
LEV + 0.001   0.001   0.001   (0.729) 1.44 0.697 (0.779) 1.44 0.695 (0.777) 1.44 0.695 
ROA + 0.006   0.006   0.006   (0.215) 1.16 0.859 (0.194) 1.17 0.857 (0.198) 1.17 0.857 
SIZE + 0.470***   0.471***   0.477***   (0.000) 2.76 0.362 (0.000) 2.83 0.353 (0.000) 2.78 0.359 
BSIZE + 0.026   0.038   0.028   (0.304) 1.87 0.5349 (0.132) 1.88 0.533 (0.255) 1.84 0.544 
INSOWN - -0.008*   -0.009*   -0.008*   (0.079) 1.26 0.792 (0.075) 1.20 0.831 (0.082) 1.24 0.803 
CGCM +/- 0.508   0.332   0.413   (0.395) 1.87 0.535 (0.579) 1.93 0.517 (0.477) 1.88 0.532 
COMER +/- 0.879*   0.758   0.835*   (0.061) 4.41 0.227 (0.127) 4.46 0.224 (0.078) 4.42 0.226 
CONST +/- 0.966**   0.788*   0.864**   (0.011) 3.13 0.319 (0.058) 3.32 0.301 (0.016) 3.18 0.315 
EW +/- 0.783*   0.631   0.703   (0.087) 3.06 0.327 (0.158) 3.14 0.301 (0.108) 3.06 0.326 
FININS +/- -0.051   -0.187   -0.140   (0.947) 1.95 0.514 (0.802) 1.96 0.509 (0.851) 1.96 0.509 
CHIN +/- 0.849   0.641   0.795   (0.207) 2.09 0.477 (0.357) 2.11 0.474 (0.231) 2.08 0.480 
RE +/- -1.313**   -1.360***   -1.345***   (0.010) 4.48 0.223 (0.009) 4.53 0.220 (0.008) 4.53 0.220 
MASSM +/- 1.039**   0.841   0.924*   (0.028) 2.08 0.480 (0.104) 2.19 0.455 (0.051) 2.10 0.475 
BMI +/- 0.814**   0.712*   0.736*   (0.038) 2.37 0.421 (0.091) 2.40 0.416 (0.066) 2.39 0.419 
OPI +/- 0.750*   0.611   0.700*   (0.068) 7.11 0.140 (0.147) 7.21 0.138 (0.081) 7.11 0.140 
MPI +/- 0.320   0.154   0.250   (0.471) 3.99 0.250 (0.746) 4.09 0.244 (0.569) 4.00 0.250 
OTHR +/- 
0.697   0.552   0.649   
(0.117) 3.35 0.298 (0.226) 3.39 0.294 (0.140) 3.34 0.299 
Obs 1.018 1.018 1.018 
R2 32.95% 32.87% 33.12% 
